The xz/liblzma vulnerability has sparked discussions about a sophisticated attack that took advantage of maintainer burnout. The attacker gained trust through manipulation and inserted a backdoor, raising concerns about other potentially compromised projects. Detecting such elaborate attacks remains a challenge, transcending conventional cybersecurity standards.
No checklist or cybersecurity standard can help detecting or defending against DECEPTION like the one we’ve seen leading to backdooring XZ, Debian, and other attempts. Not MITRE, not OWASP, not NIST or WHATEVER, no SOC, certainly no product. Not at this level of sophistication.
With the #xz #backdoor any thinking person should be asking themselves, if they could get away with this and just narrowly got caught what else has been compromised to this level but has gone unnoticed?
Some interesting thoughts on the xz compression backdoor in liblzma (and the insertion of what appears to be the attacker’s own RSA key in OpenSSH Server on systems that use xz 5.6.x) here: https://t.co/YYRHzOXZcC