The U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation on Aug. 5 released a roughly 300-page report concluding that the June 18, 2023 implosion of OceanGate’s Titan tourist submersible was “entirely preventable.” Board chair Jason Neubauer said the findings underscore “a need for stronger oversight” of vessels employing novel designs after the accident killed all five people on board during a dive to the Titanic wreck. Investigators found that OceanGate’s inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection regime—particularly the carbon-fiber hull—was the primary cause of failure. The company avoided third-party classification, stored the 22-foot craft outdoors over a Canadian winter and ignored real-time hull-stress warnings. The report describes a toxic workplace in which CEO Stockton Rush, facing mounting financial pressure, dismissed safety concerns and used intimidation tactics, including litigation, to silence whistleblowers. Rush, who piloted the dive and died in the accident, was cited for negligence that would have prompted a criminal referral had he survived. The implosion also claimed the lives of British explorer Hamish Harding, French diver Paul-Henri Nargeolet and Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman. Debris was later located about 500 meters from the Titanic’s bow, 3,800 meters below the surface. To close regulatory gaps, the Coast Guard issued 17 recommendations. They call for ending the “oceanographic research vessel” loophole used by Titan, mandating third-party classification for commercial submersibles, requiring pre-dive safety plans and enhancing whistleblower protections in coordination with OSHA. The board also urged the International Maritime Organization to convert non-binding passenger-submersible guidelines into enforceable standards.